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There is an increasingly urgent need for new antibiotics, yet there is a 
significant and persistent economic problem when it comes to 
developing such medicines. The problem stems from the perceived 
need for a “market” to drive commercial antibiotic development. In 
this article, we explore abandoning the market as a prerequisite for 
successful antibiotic research and development. Once one stops 
trying to fix a market model that has stopped functioning, one is free 
to carry out research and development (R&D) in ways that are more 
openly collaborative, a mechanism that has been demonstrably 
effective for the R&D underpinning the response to the COVID 
pandemic. New “open source” research models have great potential 
for the development of medicines for areas of public health where the 
traditional profit-driven model struggles to deliver. New financial 
initiatives, including major push/pull incentives, aimed at fixing the 
broken antibiotics market provide one possible means for funding an 
openly collaborative approach to drug development. We argue that 
now is therefore the time to evaluate, at scale, whether such methods 
can deliver new medicines through to patients, in a timely manner.
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Publication in Wellcome Open Research does not imply 
endorsement by Wellcome.
1) We need new antibiotics and access to 
antibiotics
Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is a serious threat to glo-
bal public health because it leads to the spread of bacte-
ria that cannot be eliminated or controlled with existing 
medicines1,2. We have been extensively warned that we are 
entering a post-antibiotic era3 as antibiotic-resistant bacteria 
now cause an estimated 25,000 deaths in Europe alone every 
year4–6. Nevertheless, in 2015 more people still died from lack 
of access to otherwise effective antibiotics than antibiotic 
resistance7. As of 2019, there were 43 antibiotics and combi-
nations which contain a new therapeutic entity in clinical or 
preclinical development for the treatment of serious bacterial 
infections, but only 15 of these antibiotics have the potential 
to treat pathogens listed as priorities by the World Health 
Organisation (WHO)8 and there is particular urgency regarding 
the lack of new treatments for gram-negative pathogens. As 
the success rate of the drug development pipeline remains 
low, there is an urgent need for novel antibiotics to circum-
vent the threat from AMR, and our ability to treat common 
infections9.
2) There is an economic problem in developing 
antibiotics
The central problem of the empty antibiotic pipeline is not 
scientific but economic. Between the 1930s and 1960s, sig-
nificant antibiotic innovation resulted from large-scale public 
and private screening programs and targeted drug develop-
ment, initially driven by the lack of effective antibacterial 
treatments10,11. By the early 1980s, private investment in antimi-
crobial research ebbed as a result of generational change within 
pharmaceutical companies and a broader reorientation of pri-
vate research and development (R&D) towards more focused 
investment in expensive yet lucrative noncommunicable (e.g., 
cancer and lifestyle) medications12,13 as well as a change in a 
perception of need, arising from the effectiveness of existing 
antibiotics14. The decline in private investment was exacer-
bated by the parallel closure of formerly successful public R&D 
efforts, as a result of the contemporary political emphasis on 
privatization and marketplace-oriented research.
The disappearance of substantial investment in functionally 
new antibiotic classes did not mean that scientific research on 
new antibiotics had reached an impasse15,16. During the 1980s 
and 1990s, smaller biotech start-ups, publicly funded research-
ers, and researchers within larger companies continued to 
employ classic screening and new molecular approaches to find 
and develop promising compounds17,18. The problem was that 
there was no longer sufficient public or private investment for 
these compounds to move beyond early stages of pre-clinical 
development or clinical trialling19–23. Already diagnosed in 
the mid-1990s, the described disconnect between scientific 
potential and lack of substantial development support from 
industry continues to this day. 
Since 2010, the United States Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) has approved approximately 20 new antimicrobials24. 
However, from a classic economics perspective, antibiotics remain 
unable to compete with the profitability of blockbuster drugs. 
The profitability of the broader antibiotic market is constrained 
by the widespread availability of competitive cheap generic 
compounds (“crowding out” newer, more expensive medicines), 
the ‘short course’ treatment afforded by the rapid ‘chemical 
surgery’ antibiotics provide, and current reimbursement 
practices1,25. Potential market size for new compounds is fur-
ther constrained by stewardship concerns, and profitability is 
lowered further by the cost of meeting regulatory requirements 
and the low prices of currently marketed antibiotics. There is 
accordingly a significantly delayed economic return on the 
investment that created the drug, in many cases destroying the 
traditional economic incentive for drug development (this 
situation is commonly referred to as the “fire extinguisher prob-
lem,” referring to an object that is important to have, but not 
to use)26,27. Investing in new antibiotics is considered high 
risk, driving companies to decide to move away from antimi-
crobial research28,29; high profile examples from 2016–2019 
include Novartis, Sanofi, AstraZeneca, and GSK30–33.
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are major con-
tributors to preclinical development globally, accounting for 
81% of antibacterial programmes34,35. Although a driving 
force in innovation, SMEs are struggling to finance their 
efforts1,28,29. The recent bankruptcies of Achaogen, Tetraphase 
Pharmaceuticals, Aradigm, and Melinta Therapeutics – all SME 
biotechs which recently gained FDA approval for novel anti-
biotics and which were actually selling them – highlights the 
need for new political and economic models for antimicrobial 
research and development1,23,29,36,37.
3) Is there an antibiotics market?
One must inevitably ask: is there a viable market for new anti-
biotics? Are attempts to revive and use traditional systems 
of market lure to combat AMR going to work?
If the answers are ‘no’, and we abandon the notion that a profit 
is required, then we open up different ways of conceiving the 
development of new medicines: ones that are not required to 
align with the rules designed to deliver economic return. If we 
also abandon the idea of a ‘market’ for new antibiotics, acknowl-
edging the market failures of the current approach38 and reframe 
antibiotics as public goods that keep established health-care 
infrastructure running and serve as a foundation for developing 
health-care systems, then we can develop an orthogonal devel-
opment model that replaces, or at least sits alongside, the cur-
rent market-led, for-profit development approach. On the one 
hand, public funding must play a key role in future efforts, 
but on the other hand new development and reimbursement 
mechanisms can be conceived and trialled alongside existing 
public stimuli programs for private initiatives.
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Despite an abundance of successful real-world models of 
public pharmaceutical development, Western state and non-
governmental funders have, since the 1980s, almost exclu-
sively adopted neoliberal economic thinking, which demands 
a dominant role for the private sector in the full translation to 
clinical practice, and which simply dismisses the public sec-
tor as an option. However, this is a political emphasis on 
market-based solutions, and glosses over ample real-world evi-
dence for successful public R&D projects that resulted in the 
rollout of transformative pharmaceutical interventions - includ-
ing penicillin, which was famously not patented10. (The current 
COVID19 pandemic may well provide further starting points 
for new development and distribution models due to the 
major challenge of rolling out vaccines globally.) This imbal-
ance is being addressed through the exploration of new devel-
opment solutions targeting early-stage scientific initiatives 
(Section 4) and economic models (Section 5).
4) There are initiatives aimed at finding new 
starting points and monitoring activity
There are already several initiatives outside the pharma indus-
try aimed at facilitating the early-stage discovery of new anti-
biotics. Agencies such as the Directorate-General for Research 
and Innovation, European Commission (DG-RTD), the US 
National Institutes of Health (NIH)39, and the UK National Insti-
tute for Health Research (NIHR) have recognized the need for 
funding basic research grants and fellowships and have launched 
internal initiatives40,41. Public-private partnerships such as 
CARB-X42–44 and the Innovative Medicines Initiative’s New 
Drugs for Bad Bugs (ND4BB)45,46 aim to distribute risk among 
public and private entities while providing platforms for collabo-
ration and resource-sharing. Other initiatives, such as the Pew 
Trust’s SPARK platform47–49, which provides an open, curated 
database of antibacterial research, and the Community of Open 
Antimicrobial Drug Discovery (CO-ADD)50–53, a free screening 
service against high-priority ESKAPE bacteria and fungal 
pathogens, encourage participation of new researchers, and 
the open sharing of information and resources54. The Revive 
initiative from The Global Antibiotic Research and Devel-
opment Partnership (GARDP), a joint initiative between the 
World Health Organization and Drugs for Neglected Diseases 
initiative (DNDi), aims to ensure that knowledge gained in pre-
vious and ongoing antimicrobial campaigns is shared through-
out the antibiotic drug discovery community, and that new 
projects can benefit from the experience of those best placed 
to advise55,56. In addition, the Access to Medicines Foun-
dation has recently published the 2020 AMR Benchmark 
evaluating how 30 pharmaceutical companies, all of which 
voluntarily provide data for the scoring evaluation exercise, 
are responding to the global threat of AMR57. Combined, these 
initiatives provide a framework for funding, data sharing and 
information mining, and research support in service of accelerat-
ing the discovery of new antibacterial agents. Despite encour-
aging the community towards greater collaborative efforts, 
the feature behind many, perhaps all, of these initiatives is 
that they assume that ultimately market forces will still be 
needed to bring developments to the clinic.
5) Some proposed solutions to the economic 
challenge
State and non-governmental actors have started to respond to 
the fundamental economic challenge of market-led antibiotic 
R&D with several proposed remedies58,59. The final report of 
the Review on Antimicrobial Resistance suggested that sub-
stantial push (direct funding, pre-approval) and pull (incentive, 
post-approval) mechanisms would likely be needed5,60,61. Regu-
latory agencies such as the European Medicines Agency and 
the US FDA have offered incentives designed to increase 
the market exclusivity period for new antibiotics, thereby 
increasing their profitability40. Significant push incentives 
are being offered through investment in early stage projects 
by CARB-X and the Novo REPAIR Fund62,63. The phar-
maceutical industry has recently come together to form the 
AMR Action Fund64, an unprecedented push collabora-
tion with the World Health Organisation (WHO), The Euro-
pean Investment Bank (EIB), and the Wellcome Trust to invest 
nearly $1bn focussing on the later stages of development and 
which aims to bring two to four new antibiotics to patients by 
2030. These very welcome investments of resources are nev-
ertheless just the beginning of the commitment that is likely 
to be needed65. Note added in proof: a recently-published analy-
sis (REF) suggests that the discounted net present value of a new 
antibiotic is $240M, considerably below the probable development 
costs, and that the US market accounts for >80% of sales.
Other solutions to the antibiotics market involve pull incen-
tives that attempt to provide a guaranteed income stream for 
companies that successfully bring molecules to market, the 
so-called ‘delinked market entry rewards’. These rewards 
attempt to fix one of the most serious of the market failures, 
that companies selling approved, novel antibiotics can never-
theless still go bankrupt. Recently, the UK has announced that 
it will trial a ‘subscription model’ of paying for antibiotics, in 
which health providers will pay for future access to anti-
biotics kept in reserve, regardless of the level of use (i.e., 
‘delinkage’)66–68. Similarly, the Swedish government has com-
missioned the Public Health Agency of Sweden (PHAS) to 
propose and pilot new models for keeping approved antibiot-
ics available on the Swedish market, while contending with 
the overuse that can lead to resistance69. The PASTEUR Act, 
currently proceeding through governmental approval in the 
US, aims for a similar outcome70,71. Such schemes rely on other 
governments stepping up with similar levels of (proportional) 
commitment72.
Reimbursement models are challenging when considering new, 
breakthrough medicines, where the cost of that medicine needs 
to be weighed against the lower cost of one that is compara-
tively less effective. If the ‘cost’ of a drug is interpreted simply, 
there may be financial pressure for new, expensive medicines 
to be prescribed less frequently than cheaper, less effective 
medicines, purely to reduce the outlay on the drug itself. Of 
course, this ignores the very significant costs associated with 
ongoing patient care (e.g., non-surgical hospital admission 
and nosocomial infection). In late 2019, the USA Centers for 
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Medicare & Medicaid Services announced it was changing 
the way hospitals are reimbursed for antibiotics and treatment 
of antimicrobial resistance, improving the ability for resistant 
infections to be classified for higher payments, and boosting 
payments for new antibiotics73,74.
A further suggestion has been the creation of public benefit 
corporations as hybrids of for- and non-profit approaches75. 
Similar to other public utilities, such corporations would com-
bine operations for the social good with a moderate profit 
incentive and be able to access both public and private capi-
tal; core capital would be provided by charities and public 
sector entities, and shares would be sold with the expecta-
tion of moderate profits. However, substantial pull incentives 
like market entry rewards would still be needed to maintain 
long-term viability. Finally, a fully non-profit model has been 
proposed, where the requirements for returns are lower and 
any profit resulting from the sale of antibiotics could be rein-
vested in continuing development76. GARDP is an example 
of such a non-profit entity that aims to develop five new 
treatments by 202577,78. All of these proposals are aimed at 
simultaneously incentivising the development of novel antibiotics, 
and enabling access for those who need them.
Many of the economic solutions described above are chal-
lenging to implement because they do not address the basic 
paradox of section 3; namely that, despite the societal costs 
of untreatable resistant infections, there is currently no via-
ble market for new antibiotics. In the absence of such a 
self-sustaining market, public funds are being mobilised to 
create and sustain a market that is artificial.
While it is likely that we will need a range of public and pri-
vate solutions if we are to solve a challenge of this magnitude 
in a way that delivers results not just for the next five years 
but for decades to come, it is unlikely that trying to recre-
ate a broken marketplace will achieve this goal. However, if 
we acknowledge that there is no market for antibiotics, and 
acknowledge that there are bold new economic proposals being 
developed, does that open new ways for us to work together 
on the science?
6) Traditional development approaches are tied to 
secrecy
It is important to note what is shared between all the proposed 
economic solutions to drug development: secrecy. Though 
early-stage data may be shared eventually, all downstream 
drug development is conducted out of the public eye such that 
intellectual property may be protected using patents; that 
intellectual property (IP) is leveraged to recoup financial 
investment (ideally with a significant profit margin). This has 
three effects: 1) the preclinical R&D is less effective because 
it is less collaborative; 2) there is a persistent danger of unnec-
essary duplication of effort and therefore increased cost; 
and 3) the discovery and development of a new antibiotic 
remains thought of only as a ‘private sector’ problem, rather 
than a challenge for us as a society and a consequent pub-
lic good. If there is no market for antibiotics, and if traditional 
protection of intellectual property is not needed, then what if we 
abandoned secrecy altogether?
7) We advocate for an additional, open approach 
to antibiotic R&D
Given the significant problems caused by the requirement 
for return-on-investment in current thinking, we advo-
cate removing the requirement for secrecy and IP protection. 
The alternative is a transparent drug development approach 
in which all data and ideas are shared, anyone may partici-
pate, and advances will not be protected by patents. Adopt-
ing such an ‘open source’ approach acknowledges its success in 
creating market-leading, robust software underpinning much 
of the world’s online productivity79. There exist biomedical 
research projects benefiting from the open sharing of data 
and expertise in this way in the areas of chemical probe 
discovery80, the physical sharing of drug libraries81, and in 
drug discovery82,83. Such pilots have shown how open projects 
can democratize discovery and development by allowing 
active participation by highly qualified people (individuals 
through to crowds) who may not otherwise have an avenue to 
contribute84. Interestingly, there are examples of valuable data 
freely shared from private sector programs only once the origi-
nal program has been dropped (e.g., the sharing of Novartis 
and Achaogen data on the SPARK platform)54. Naturally there 
is a difference in scale between such activities and what is 
needed for a fully-fledged drug development program that 
would impact the fight against AMR, but the principles involved 
are the same.
We propose that the necessary elements of the discovery and 
development of new antibiotics are performed in the public 
domain, where everyone has access to all the same information. 
‘Ownership’ of the project (website content and the associ-
ated data/chemical structures) may be effected clearly through 
an appropriate licence, similar to that which already governs 
other open-source projects such as Wikipedia but adapted to 
include aspects not well covered by such licences, such as 
physical samples. The general routes by which the various stages 
of such a project could be operated and managed have previ-
ously been outlined85. There exist solutions already for some of 
the potential hurdles and novelties involved in such an endeav-
our, for example possible means for production/distribution 
(e.g. exploiting existing infrastructure underpinning the gener-
ics industry) and stewardship (via a series sponsor or other 
agency that would be involved in clinical trials in the same 
way as for any other development project). There are many 
other potential challenges in establishing such a new approach, 
such as how to convince potential funders of the economic 
feasibility of the approach (see section 9), how to replace IP 
and patent outcomes as a mark of success in this field and 
how to recognise the contributions to such projects towards 
a researcher’s career progression.
An existing early-stage antibiotic discovery project has recently 
been initiated as an example of how the open-source approach 
might operate, and as a way to identify more clearly the 
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obstacles to success86. A key criterion is to develop an effec-
tive medicine that is affordable and made appropriately acces-
sible yet which would be subject to the same international 
best practice around responsible use and stewardship. As we 
write this article, there is a marked increase of similar calls 
for a more open culture towards coronavirus research in order 
to accelerate the development of an affordable cure, and 
many of the same issues will apply87.
It should be noted that the development of openly-available 
assets is not incompatible with recent stimulus proposals such 
as the PASTEUR Act and the AMR Action Fund, provid-
ing strong financial incentives for investment in such projects. 
A further interesting aspect of open projects is of note here. 
There is a significant risk with the deployment of push and 
pull incentives that, if they are unbalanced, assets could build 
up and languish if they are seen as insufficiently promis-
ing for private sector capital investment, potentially wasting 
the original public sector investment. If all assets are openly 
available, they may instead be taken on by any sponsor.
8) What are the risks of this approach?
Objections raised to an open way of working may centre on 
the fear that ‘people will take what you have and run with it, in 
secret’; this may disincentivize contributions (for fear of los-
ing credit for those contributions) even though patient ben-
efit could still arise. Such ‘taking and running’ is possible, but it 
is unlikely. Open projects typically self-assemble high qual-
ity teams of scientists and thereby develop both momentum 
and community buy-in, including from global pharma employ-
ees (as part of corporate social responsibility initiatives) who 
enjoy the freedom such projects offer. Since all results, and all 
future experiments, are in the public domain, it is a challenge 
for a competing group to scope out the non-intuitive space 
required for IP protection; this ‘scorched earth’ approach to 
public disclosure brings with it a significant responsibility 
for an open-source project to be completed once it has been 
started. More generally it is not clear why anyone would 
wish to invest in a traditional, closed project that is attempt-
ing to find a medicine similar to one arising from an open 
project that is committed to equitable pricing (particularly 
when the closed model has been shown to be financially unvi-
able). For later manufacturing and distribution, competition 
between generics suppliers would exist for openly-derived 
medicines just as it does now. One might also envisage that 
licences to supply governments with such medicines can be 
auctioned, in the same way that companies supply major cli-
ents (e.g., WHO) with supplies of medicines for neglected 
tropical diseases.
Pharmaceutical firms interested in remaining in this area would 
be free to compete with any open approach, or to collabo-
rate with such projects in return for agreements on any future 
profits that might be required to make the collaboration com-
mercially palatable, or in return for benefits associated with 
public acclaim through corporate social responsibility88. 
We have recently seen such acclaim for investment in 
public goods with the significant contributions from the 
private sector towards COVID-19 vaccines, for example in the 
Oxford-AstraZeneca project.
9) How could we fund open antibiotic R&D?
Open source research is not free. Contributions arise from all 
sectors (from seasoned professional researchers in the phar-
maceutical industry through to cohorts of students and early 
career researchers), yet major funding would still be 
required to develop a new antibiotic and a sponsor would be 
required to take overall ownership.
Will there be innovative sustainable funding for open projects, 
to retain accessible technology platforms, training, and 
knowledge transfer to progress projects, particularly through 
the ‘valley of death’ and the more expensive later stages of 
development? The pursuit of a low-cost, effective new medi-
cine will make open projects attractive to existing funding 
sources from governments (via grants)89, philanthropists (via 
donations), and non-governmental organizations (via honest 
brokership and in-kind coordination, e.g., Medicines for 
Malaria Venture, DNDi, GARD-P, and emerging charities). 
There are already existing advocates for90, and agencies pur-
suing or supporting91,92, a public-good development model 
(without necessarily opening up the research). As mentioned 
above, the newer push and pull incentives designed to fix a 
broken market for antibiotics are compatible with an open 
source way of working, even if they were not explicitly 
developed with such an approach in mind. Thus, for exam-
ple, early stages of discovery are eligible for funding through 
CARB-X, later stages through the AMR Action Fund, and 
post-approval financial support through a subscription model 
(of which the PASTEUR Act is an example).
The above mechanisms are broadly supported by all those 
involved in the development of new antibiotics, and it is impor-
tant not to confuse such funding with “drug discovery by 
governments” which is not being proposed here. Yet beyond 
public or philanthropic funding, there is also a way to con-
duct the research in a company setting using existing regula-
tory data and/or market exclusivities specifically designed to 
increase innovation in drug development. A sponsor conduct-
ing open research resulting in an approved medicine can still 
benefit from existing, multi-year protections from generic 
competition in major jurisdictions (despite there being no pat-
ent protection), a strategy being tested by M4K Pharma, a 
for-profit company seeking a therapy for a rare, uniformly 
fatal paediatric brain tumour93. The company is fully owned 
by a non-profit trust, to which any profits are gifted in pur-
suit of an affordable medicine. One can therefore combine 
the mission-oriented approach of a company with the pursuit 
of a new medicine using an inclusive, open research model. 
Notably, the United States offers a significant exclusivity 
extension for new antimicrobials that address serious or 
life-threatening infections. To this end has been founded 
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Medicines for Infectious Disease (M4ID) Pharma which is 
intending to trial this model for pathogenic infections including 
antibiotics94.
10) Conclusion
As there is no viable market for new antibiotics, we are free 
to open the process of drug development. Though there have 
been pilots of initiatives that demonstrate the associated 
benefits of open research, there is a significant difference 
in their scale versus the usual project size that results in the 
development of a new medicine. A combination of approaches 
will be needed to make fresh progress against AMR. We are 
seeing bold new economic ideas involving push/pull incentives 
and leveraging of market exclusivities; these can now be used 
to fund bold, open source research practices that will acceler-
ate the science towards new medicines. Just as there is an urgent 
need for new antibiotics, there is a corresponding urgency 
in our need to test, at scale, bold new ideas that have not yet 
been properly explored.
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The Open Letter by Klug et al. entitled ‘There is no market for new antibiotics: this allows an open 
approach to research and development’ outlines a provocative potential solution to the multiple 
and massive challenges this industry has faced historically, and which seem unrelenting going 
forward. The authors provide, in the cogent and well-referenced description, how the commercial 
market for new antibiotics has collapsed as well as emerging innovative economic “push” and 
“pull” solutions to this problem by public and private stakeholders. However, to confront these 
challenges the authors propose that an ‘open-source’ solution to antibiotic development, which 
rejects the constraints posed by the broken antibiotic commercial market, is needed to solve the 
conundrum. 
Given the problems caused by the requirement for return-on-investment in the antibiotic space, 
an open and collaborative approach to drug discovery is advocated – one that removes the 
requirement for secrecy and intellectual property protection and promotes transparency as a 
force multiplier for drug development. Funding to support such an initiative could be available 
through the same sources available to private companies. Unlike the often-cited example of open-
source principles driving the success of the internet, however, skepticism of its impact on 
antibiotic development seems warranted. How appropriate is this analogy to the ‘wet lab’ setting 
of drug development? Even if a parallel open-source development strategy were adopted to solve 
market forces, how many new issues are created? Issues of program governance, management, 
investigator incentives, timelines, and eventual sponsors of the commercial product remain. It is 
also difficult to imagine how the approach would be sufficiently scalable to successfully span the 
decade-plus years required through discovery, preclinical and clinical stages of development. 
Notwithstanding such concerns, the authors suggest an innovative potential solution to the issues 
we face and if applied even only to the discovery/early development space, it could be impactful.
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